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Judicial Selection Methods, Tribal Politics,
& Strong Government: Navajo Nation
at the Crossroads
Bethany Sullivan*

INTRODUCTION
The Navajo Nation is widely recognized as one of the preeminent models
of American Indian tribal sovereignty. At the heart of this success is the Navajo
Nation judicial branch—a striking example of how tribal courts can thrive in the
present legal environment while remaining faithful to customary law and traditional
methods of dispute resolution. However, in a common tale that transcends all
cultural, geographic and temporal boundaries, internal power struggles between
different branches of the Navajo government once again swept the judiciary into
the political fray. The 2010 debate, which focused on how members of the
judiciary are selected, had the potential to fundamentally restructure the Navajo
judicial system and is representative of a historic and ongoing clash between the
Navajo governmental branches over judicial selection methods. While the
particular legislation raising the issue has been invalidated, this history indicates
that the issue will likely rise again. But before drastic action is taken by either the
Navajo Nation Council or the Navajo electorate, it is essential that all parties pause
and reflect - reflect on their current judicial system, the overt and covert reasons for
change, and the potential effect such change may have on the Navajo Nation as a
whole.
In an attempt to facilitate such reflection, this Article compares the various
methods of judicial selection and, in light of the unique history and culture of the
Navajo people, ultimately argues for the maintenance of the existing appointive
method. Section I introduces the 2010 political push for judicial elections as
embodied by the Judicial Elections Referendum Act. 1 Section II then provides an
overview of judicial selection methods in the United States and highlights the
pervasive criticism of judicial elective systems. Section III hones in on the Navajo
Nation court system by describing the historical evolution of the Navajo courts and
the central role that judicial appointment has played in that development. Section
IV returns to the Judicial Elections Referendum Act and critically evaluates both
the manner in which the Navajo Nation Council presented this legislation and the
potential effect of its substantive provisions on the Navajo people. In conclusion,
the Article warns against current or future efforts to reform the Navajo appointive
system, particularly where such efforts lack serious consideration of the social,
political and economic ramifications on Navajo Nation.

*

J.D. 2011 University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law. The Author would like to thank
Professor Ray Austin for his considerable guidance and unparalleled knowledge of the Navajo Nation.
1
Navajo Nation Council. Leg. No. 0359-10, An Act Relating to Judiciary; Approving the Judicial
Elections Referendum Act of 2010; Referring a Referendum Measure to the November 2, 2010 Navajo
Nation General Election Ballot with a Question Whether to Amend Titles 2, 7, and 11 of the Navajo
Nation Code to Provide for the Election of Navajo Nation District Court Judges and Supreme Court
Justices (Navajo Nation 2010) [hereinafter Judicial Elections Referendum Act].
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I. The Judicial Elections Referendum Act of 2010
Although judicial elections have repeatedly been considered and rejected by the
Navajo Nation Council in the past, the issue resurfaced on June 17, 2010, in the
form of the Judicial Elections Referendum Act of 2010. While proponents of the
referendum espoused democratic principles and the Navajo public‘s choice, the
legislation was wrought with political overtones and reflected an on-going power
struggle among the three branches of government. Perhaps more importantly, the
legislation aimed to fundamentally re-structure the Navajo judiciary and could have
triggered consequences that extend to the Navajo Nation as a whole. Due to the
cyclical emergence of this issue, it is imperative that the matter of whether to
institute judicial elections is thoroughly evaluated and discussed by the Navajo
people and their leaders—a call that rings true for any tribal nation considering the
best method for selecting members of its judiciary.
A. Description of the Referendum and its Current Status
The Judicial Elections Referendum Act sprung into life in June 2010 via a
proposed Navajo Nation Council resolution. 2 The Act‘s main objective was to add
a referendum ballot question in the November 2010 elections that would give the
Navajo people an opportunity to decide ―whether to change the positions of all
Navajo Nation District Court Judges and all Navajo Nation Supreme Court Justices
from their current status as appointed probationary and permanent positions to
elected positions subject to retention elections.‖3 However, this description belies
the full thrust of the Act. As the legislation‘s descriptive summary suggests, judges
and justices would become subject to contested elections, followed by four-year
terms and retention elections. 4 In order to switch to an elective system, all current
judges and justices would be forced to resign or retire. 5 Campaign expenditures
would be limited to a specified amount—for Supreme Court justices, the maximum
would be $1.50 per registered voter, while District Court judges would be limited
to $4.00 per registered voter within their election precinct. 6 In addition to removal
from office due to good cause or loss of a retention election, judges and justices
would also become subject to voter-initiated removal via recall petitions. 7
The Act also included a host of other changes that do not directly relate to
judicial selection methods. First, the Act provided for the elimination of judicial
retirement benefits, excepting those judges and justices who accrued retirement
benefits under the prior appointment system. 8 The Act also removed all current
judicial qualification requirements from Title 7 and relocated them to the election
code.9 Rather than simply relocating the judicial qualifications verbatim, the Act
actually modified what is and is not required of judicial candidates. Importantly,
the Act eviscerated the required knowledge of Navajo culture and traditions, while
2

Id.
Id. at 2.
4
Id. at 19-20 (proposed 7 N.N.C. § 355(B)-(C)).
5
Id. at 15 (proposed 7 N.N.C. § 355(A)).
6
Id. at 31 (proposed 11 N.N.C. § 205(A)(1)-(2)).
7
See Judicial Elections Referendum Act, supra note 1, at 33 (proposed 11 N.N.C. § 241).
8
Id. at 11-15 (proposed 7 N.N.C. § 353).
9
Id. at 18 (proposed 7 N.N.C. § 354).
3
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maintaining the Navajo language requirement. 10 This alteration echoed a failed
effort by the Council to pass legislation prohibiting the courts from using Navajo
customs and traditions as law, a response to a prior Supreme Court ruling
upholding the people‘s right to reduce council membership from 88 to 24 under
Navajo custom.11 Lastly, the Act removed mandatory periodic evaluations of
judicial performance.12 Collectively, these proposed changes represented a
dramatic departure from the existing structure of the Navajo court system,
particularly in the manner of judicial selection.
II. An Overview of Judicial Selection Systems
There is no one-size-fits all prescription for how a jurisdiction should select the
members of its judiciary. Governments across the world use a plethora of judicial
selection methods. Within the United States alone, substantial variation exists
among the judicial selection systems employed by the federal government, states,
and tribes. These systems are loosely categorized into three general types: elective,
appointive, and merit-based.
An elective judicial selection system provides the electorate, a
jurisdiction‘s voting populace, with the authority to choose its judges and justices. 13
Following an initial election, a judge then becomes subject to either retention
elections or contested elections after a set term. Retention elections simply ask
voters whether or not the incumbent judge should remain in office. Alternatively,
contested elections open up the ballot to any other willing judicial candidates.
The appointive and merit-based methods, while theoretically distinct, are
often utilized in conjunction with one another, resulting in hybrid systems that
incorporate elements from both. In a ―pure‖ appointive system, judges are selected
by an expressly authorized governmental body, often the executive branch. 14 Once
appointed, judges either serve for life, set terms, or become subject to retention
elections. In contrast, merit-based systems involve an independent commission that
selects a pool of qualified candidates, which is then submitted to the executive

Compare 7 N.N.C. § 354(A)(5) (requiring applicants to have ―practical knowledge of the fundamental
laws of the Diné‖ and be able to demonstrate ―[a]n understanding of K‘é, including the Diné clan
system; and [a] basic understanding of traditional Navajo religious ceremonies; and [a]n understanding
of the traditional Navajo lifestyle‖), with Judicial Elections Referendum Act, supra note 1, at 24-26,
(proposed 11 N.N.C. § 8) (silent on the issue of knowledge of Navajo culture and traditions, but
requiring judicial candidates to speak both Navajo and English).
11
See Navajo Nation Council Resolution No. CJA-08-10 (Jan. 29, 2010), subject to Presidential veto on
Feb. 13, 2010. This legislation was ultimately held invalid by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court. See
Office of Navajo Nation President & Vice President v. Navajo Nation Council, No. SC-CV-02-10
(Navajo 2010).
12
Judicial Elections Referendum Act, supra note 1 at 21, (proposed 7 N.N.C. § 357).
13
Elective systems are nuanced among states. One further typological divide in these systems is
between bipartisan or nonpartisan judicial elections.
14
The United States‘ system provides a familiar example of this approach. In that system, the president
is charged with appointing federal judges subject to confirmation by the senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
State appointive systems vary between gubernatorial appointment and legislative appointment. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC‘Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE & GENERAL JURISDICTION
COURTS 1263 (2007), available at
http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/Judicial%20Selection%20Charts.pdf [hereinafter Judicial Selections
Chart].
10
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body for final appointment. 15 Following initial selection, judges may become
subject to retention elections depending on the jurisdiction.
As previously noted, much variability exists in judicial selection
mechanisms on the federal, state, and tribal governmental levels. Nonetheless, the
majority of state jurisdictions favor appointment or merit-based approaches over
elective systems, at least when it comes to their appellate courts.16 Among Indian
nation judicial selection methods, there is immense variability. Some tribes select
their judges and justices via appointment (both legislative and executive), while
others provide for direct election.17 A thorough examination of the nuances in
Indian nation judicial selection methods is beyond the scope of this paper; suffice
to say, there is no standardized approach. Additionally, the existence of judicial
elections on both the state and tribal level stands in stark contrast to judicial
selection methods used in the rest of the world—particularly since not one other
country utilizes a purely elective model of judicial selection. 18
A. Critique of Elective Systems
A review of the academic literature on judicial selection methods reveals
broad criticism of judicial elections. Much of the criticism stems from concern over
maintaining the independence and integrity of the judiciary. Specifically, critics ask
whether judges will form decisions based on public opinion, rather than on
impartial applications of the law. 19 This concern is particularly pronounced when
15

See ARIZ. JUDICIAL BRANCH Judicial Nominating Commissions,
http://www.azcourts.gov/jnc/Home.aspx (last visited May 9, 2012).
16
A 2009 survey compiled by the American Judicature Society divides selection systems into
gubernatorial appointment, legislative appointment, partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, and merit
selection. For purposes of this Article, gubernatorial appointment, legislative appointment, and merit
selection will be grouped together as ―non-elective systems,‖ while partisan and nonpartisan elections
will be referred to collectively as ―elective systems.‖ The survey reveals that on the highest appellate
court level, twenty-nine states employ non-elective systems as opposed to twenty-one states that use
elective systems. See Judicial Selections Chart. Within jurisdictions that have an intermediate appellate
court, the judges are chosen through non-elective systems in twenty-four states, while elective systems
are used in eighteen states. Id. On the trial court level the pattern reverses with twenty states utilizing
non-elective systems and twenty-seven states preferring elective systems. Id. The remaining states use a
mixture of elective and non-elective systems, depending on the particular county. See, e.g., id. at 4 (data
for Arizona indicates that counties with populations greater than 250,000 maintain non-elective systems,
while counties with populations less than 250,000 maintain elective systems for trial judge selection).
17
See, e.g., CHOCTAW NATION CONST. art. XII, § 1 (the Choctaw Nation provides for executive
appointment of tribal judges with the advice and consent of the tribal council); CSKT Laws Codified§ 12-202 (the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes appoint judges by the majority of quorum of tribal
council); HO-CHUNK NATION CONST. art. VII, §§ 10, 11 (the Ho-Chunk Nation provides for popular
election of Supreme Court justices, while trial court judges are appointed by the legislature).
18
See Daniel J. Meador, Selecting Alabama’s Appellate Judges—A Better Way, 68 ALA. LAW. 135, 140
(2007) (―[N]owhere in the world outside the United States are judges popularly elected.‖); see also John
Schwartz, Effort Begun to End Voting for Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/us/24judges.html (statement by retired Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O‘Connor emphasizing that no other nation elects its judges; also recalling international
legal conferences where other sovereigns have expressed their amazement at this popular selection
method in the United States).
19
James A. Gardner, New York’s Judicial Selection Process is Fine—It’s the Party System that Needs
Fixing, 79 SEP. N.Y. ST. B.J. 42, 43 (2007); see also Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial
Selection Debate and Why It Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1259
(explaining that insulating judges from political and personal pressures better enables them to uphold the
law, maintain separation of powers, and ensure due process).
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considering judicial reliance on campaign funds to successfully obtain or retain
office.20 The influence of campaign financing on actual and perceived judicial bias
is of such importance that it has sparked the development of recusal protocols and
has also been the subject of consideration by the United States Supreme Court. 21
An additional concern is whether the general public is capable of knowledgeably
and effectively evaluating the qualifications of judicial candidates and the
performance of incumbent judges. 22
The American Bar Association (ABA) addresses these issues at great
depth in its 2003 report on the United States judicial systems. 23 This report
represents the culmination of an ad hoc ABA commission‘s directive to study and
make recommendations on ensuring ―fairness, impartiality and accountability‖ in
state judicial systems.24 Among the Commission‘s assorted recommendations is the
clear preference for judicial selection by a commission-based appointive system.
Specifically, the Commission suggests a system whereby a credible, nonpartisan
entity deliberates the qualifications of each judicial candidate before compiling a
list of finalists from which the governor then chooses an appointee.25 The merits of
such an approach are multifold: guaranteed selection of sufficiently qualified
judges;26 protection against the danger of favoritism inherent in a purely appointive
system; and significant reduction of the politicization associated with judicial
elections.27
The Commission further recommends that judges not be subject to
reselection processes, like retention elections; rather judicial accountability should
be maintained through regular performance evaluations and disciplinary
mechanisms.28 This recommendation stems from the previously mentioned concern
with de-politicizing judicial decisions and reinforcing the independence and
integrity of the judiciary. By removing direct accountability to the electorate,
judges need not feel pressured to make decisions based on public polls. 29
20

See generally Bert Brandenburg, Big Money and Impartial Justice: Can They Live Together?, 52
ARIZ. L. REV. 207 (2010).
21
See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
22
Gardner, supra note 19, at 43.
23
See Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the American Bar Association Commission
on the 21st Century Judiciary (2003), http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.pdf [hereinafter
ABA REPORT].
24
Id. at i.
25
See id. at v.
26
See id. at iv (―States should establish credible, neutral, non-partisan and diverse deliberative bodies to
assess the qualifications of all judicial aspirants so as to limit the candidate pool to those who are well
qualified.‖); see also id. at 27-28 (describing how the public is insufficiently familiar with judicial
candidates, judicial qualifications, and the justice system, which in turn leads to low voter turnout in
judicial races).
27
See, e.g., id. at 13-18 (discussing the increasing politicization of state courts and subsequent
problems).
28
See id. at v.
29
The Commission waxes eloquent on this point:
The laws that the people establish … are intended to protect everyone: the rich,
the poor, the majority, the minority, the powerful, and the powerless. In order for
that objective to be realized—that the law protect the one as well as the many—it
is imperative that the administration of justice not become a popularity contest.
We need judges who will tell us what the law is and how it applies in individual
cases without regard to what the results of the latest opinion poll are, what the
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Another noteworthy critic of judicial elections is retired Supreme Court
Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor. Justice O‘Connor has spearheaded the O‘Connor
Judicial Selection Initiative, a program housed by the Institute for the Advancement
of the American Legal System.30 Similar to the ABA, the Initiative exposes the
corrosive effect of contested judicial elections on the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary and, in its stead, recommends commission-based appointive
systems.31 The Initiative differs from the ABA, however, in that it supports the use
of retention elections as a device to incorporate citizen participation. 32 Nonetheless,
both organizations ascribe to the view that politics do not belong in the
courtroom.33
III. The Navajo Nation Court System
The problem of judicial selection has not escaped the Navajo people who,
in steering the development of their court system, have repeatedly researched,
debated, and decided the issue—resoundingly in favor of an appointment–merit
system. As the following sections detail, the Navajo Nation court system has
undergone a marked evolution since its early days as an instrument of the federal
government. In its contemporary form, the Navajo judiciary is a paradigm of
innovation, successfully melding components of traditional dispute resolution with
adopted elements from the western legal tradition. Furthermore, as described infra,
the Navajo‘s choice of a hybrid appointive–merit judicial selection method has
been a critical factor in fostering the Navajo courts‘ success.
A. Evolution of the Navajo Nation Courts
The genesis of the modern Navajo Nation court system can be traced to
mid-19th century New Mexico with the unsuccessful founding of the Fort Sumner
Court of Indian Offenses.34 This military court was tasked with maintaining the
judge‘s campaign contributors think, or what the political agendas of influential
public officials may be. In other words, we need judges who are independent
enough to uphold the rule of law, even when the law is unpopular.
See id. § 1 at 2.
30
See John Schwartz, Effort Begun to End Voting for Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/us/24judges.html (interview with O‘Connor on her campaign to
persuade states to choose judges based on merit, rather than through judicial elections).
31
See UNIV. OF DENVER, QUALITY JUDGES INITIATIVE, O’Connor Judicial Selection Project,
http://iaals.du.edu/initiatives/quality-judges-initiative/oconnor-judicial-selection-project/ (last visited
May 9, 2012).
32
See UNIV. OF DENVER, QUALITY JUDGES INITIATIVE, The O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan,
http://iaals.du.edu/initiatives/quality-judges-initiative/recommended-models/the-oconnor-judicialselection-plan-how-it-works-why-it-matters (last visited May 9, 2012).
33
UNIV. OF DENVER, QUALITY JUDGES INITIATIVE, O’Connor Judicial Selection Project,
http://iaals.du.edu/initiatives/quality-judges-initiative/oconnor-judicial-selection-project/ (last visited
May 9, 2012); see ABA REPORT, supra note 23 at 2 (discussing the need for ―judges who will tell us
what the law is and how it applies in individual cases without regard to what the results of the latest
opinion poll are, what the judge‘s campaign contributors think, or what the political agendas of
influential public officials may be‖).
34
This military court was located within the Bosque Redondo Reservation, the barren endpoint of the
federal government‘s forced relocation of Navajo people in 1864. Although called a reservation, Bosque
Redondo could more aptly be described as a prisoner-of-war camp that accompanied the United States‘
devastating military campaign against the Navajo people in 1863–64. See RAYMOND D. AUSTIN,
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semblance of law and order on what was essentially a forced relocation camp for
the Navajo people. The federal government drafted the rules and criminal code
with the notion that Navajo judges, under the supervision of the United States
military, would use military law to govern their decisions. However, there is no
historical evidence that this military court was ever implemented and operational. 35
Following the return to their ancestral territory, the Navajo became subject to
the authority of the Bureau of Indian Affairs through the creation of the Navajo
Agency. As part of a national federal policy to ―civilize‖ Indian people, the
Department of the Interior founded so-called ―C.F.R. courts‖36 to administer
western law on the reservations and, ultimately, destroy native culture. As
described in a contemporaneous federal district court decision, these courts were:
[E]ducational and disciplinary instrumentalities, by which the
government of the United States is endeavoring to improve and
elevate the condition of these dependent tribes to whom it
sustains the relation of guardian. In fact, the reservation itself is
in the nature of a school, and the Indians are gathered there,
under the charge of an agent, for the purpose of acquiring the
habits, ideas, and aspirations which distinguish the civilized from
the uncivilized man.37
The Navajo‘s own C.F.R. court was established in 1892.38 As the name
implies, the Code of Federal Regulations officially controlled both the selection of
judges and the underlying substantive law. 39 However, the judges themselves were
Navajo and frequently incorporated Navajo common law into their decisions. 40
Even though the C.F.R. judicial system was designed to be adversarial in nature,
Navajo judges utilized traditional resolution tactics, such as nályééh, which
provides for apology, forgiveness and restitution in order to compensate harmed
parties.41 Such efforts by the Navajo C.F.R. judges ensured the perpetuation of
Navajo common law in the face of abject assimilation.42
The Navajo C.F.R. court prevailed until 1958 when the Navajo people
assumed control over their judiciary and revolutionized the system by creating
―Navajo Courts with Navajo judges who would apply the laws of the Navajo
Nation.‖43 Rather than existing as a constituent of the federal government, the

NAVAJO COURTS & NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE 2–3 (Univ.
Minn. P. 2009).
35
See id. at 4–5.
36
This name derives from the administrative regulations, codified in the Code of Federal Regulations,
which governed the creation and implementation of such courts. These courts have also been referred to
as ―Courts of Indian Offenses.‖
37
U.S. v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D.C. Or. 1888).
38
See AUSTIN, supra note 34, at 21.
39
See id. at 21–22.
40
Id. at 22–23.
41
Id. at 23.
42
See id. at 25.
43
See Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CO-69-58, 1 (Oct. 16, 1958); see also Navajo Nation Judicial
Branch, Office of the Chief Justice, Orientation Materials Prepared for the Judiciary and Government
Services Committees of the Navajo Nation Council and the Election Commission, Issue: Should Navajo
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Navajo Nation court system transformed into a truly Navajo entity, operating under
the auspices of Navajo Nation law. The newly created judicial branch consisted of
several trial courts, as well as a Court of Appeals led by a Chief Justice. 44 The
Chief Justice served as head of the judicial branch and supervised all the judges
therein.45
In setting up the Navajo Nation court system, the Navajo Nation Council
debated at great length the method by which judges should be chosen. Council
meeting minutes reveal substantial concern with the ability of judicial elections to
undermine a court‘s independence and integrity. As one councilmember expressed,
It is very important that politics not play a part in our
judicial system or in any way influence them to make decisions
whereby maybe a Councilman in trouble or something like that,
just because he is a Councilman, might get a little lighter
sentence than another person on the Reservation. … If we have
the elective system, then there are some pressures that can be
applied. A person might say, ―Well, if you make this judgment
now, I will make sure that you don‘t get elected again next
time.‖46
Furthermore, the Navajo Nation‘s own dalliance with judicial elections
during the time of its CFR court left many members wary because they found that
it destroyed the efficacy of judicial processes. 47 This breakdown was so
problematic that the Council chose to describe it in the preamble to their resolution
establishing an appointive system:
[U]nder the system of elective judges, there has been such a
marked breakdown of the court system in failure to enforce
orders, enforce collection of debts, protect contracts and secure
basic legal rights, that the Reservation may soon confront new
pressure to extend State jurisdiction. 48
Accordingly, the Council determined that trial court judges would be
appointed by the Chairman of the Navajo Nation Council with confirmation by the
Council. The Chief Justice was to be selected in a similar fashion and vested with
power to choose temporary associate justices from among trial judges to serve in
particular cases. The Council‘s rationale for selecting an appointive system is
clearly set out in the council resolution:

Nation Judges Be Elected? 2-3 (Mar. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Should Navajo Nation Judges Be Elected?],
part of Conference Materials for Conference on the Issues: Election of the Judges of the Navajo Nation
(Mar. 1, & 2, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Conference Materials]. A number of factors served as the impetus
behind this transition, namely the imminent threat of state usurpation of Navajo Nation jurisdiction via
Public Law 280, as well as inadequate BIA funding and support for the existing legal system. Id.; see
also AUSTIN, supra note 34, at 28.
44
See Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CO-69-58, 2-3 (Oct. 16, 1958).
45
See id. at 5-6.
46
Meeting Minutes, Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CO-69-58, 353 (Oct. 17, 1958).
47
Id. at 352.
48
Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CO-69-58, whereas cl. 2
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In order to give adequate authority to the judges, obtain
the best qualified personnel for the courts and to remove the
judges, insofar as possible, from the pressure of politics in
making decisions and enforcing the law, it is essential that
Navajo Tribal judges hereafter be appointed rather than elected.49
The judicial structure created by the 1958 reform has continued largely
intact into the present day with a few notable exceptions. In 1978, in response to an
appellate court decision establishing the power of judicial review of council
legislation, the Chairmen and his supporters attempted to gain control over the
courts by creating the Supreme Judicial Council. 50 This quasi-legislative body was
bestowed with power of review over appellate court decisions,51 creating inherent
difficulties with the maintenance of separation of powers and judicial
independence. Such a system proved to be unworkable and consequently, the
Navajo judicial system undertook a major overhaul in 1985 with the enactment of
the Judicial Reform Act.52 The Judicial Reform Act enacted several significant
changes, including disbandment of the Supreme Judicial Council, creation of more
stringent judicial qualification standards, and redesignation of the Navajo Court of
Appeals as the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation—empowered with appellate
jurisdiction as the court of final resort.53
This historical trajectory has culminated into the modern day Navajo
Nation courts, described as the ―flagship tribal judicial system‖ and studied and
emulated by legal scholars and indigenous groups across the world. 54 The Navajo
judicial system consists of ten judicial districts containing trial, family, and
traditional peacemaking forums. Additionally, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court,
seated in Window Rock, Arizona, is composed of two associate justices and one
chief justice. The court system administers an impressive caseload, presently
averaging 75,000 cases a year.55 Additionally, the Navajo Nation court system is
renowned for its incorporation of Navajo customs and traditions. Utilization of

49

Id. at whereas cl. 4.
Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CMY-39-78, 1-2 (May 4, 1978); see generally id. at whereas clauses
1–9 (articulating a perceived threat posed by the judiciary to the Council‘s authority).
51
Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CMY-39-78, 3 (May 4, 1978).
52
See Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CD-94-85, at 1-2 (Dec. 4, 1985) (―If the Navajo Nation is to
continue as a sovereign Nation and to move forward toward the reality of a three branch form of
government, the Supreme Judicial Council must cease to exist, as Tribal sovereignty requires strong and
independent Tribal courts to enforce and apply the law.‖).
53
See generally Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CD-94-85.
54
See Michael Taylor, Modern Practice in the Indian Courts, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 231, 236
(1987); see also Dale Beck Furnish, Sorting Out Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country after Plains
Commerce Bank: State Courts & the Judicial Sovereignty of the Navajo Nation, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
385, 387 (2008–2009) (lauding the Navajo Nation‘s development of a ―strong legal system and a
vigorous, effective judiciary‖).
55
JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE NAVAJO NATION, The Courts of the Navajo Nation in the Navajo Nation
Government: A Public Guide to the Courts of the Navajo Nation (last revised Jan. 2010),
http://www.navajocourts.org/publicguide.htm. The Navajo Nation courts had 73,193 open cases (yearly
caseload) for fiscal year 2009 (October 1, 2008 – September 30, 2009). See
http://www.navajocourts.org/JBReports.htm for Quarterly and Annual Reports of the Navajo Nation
courts.
50
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peacemaking and Navajo common law, as well as judicial qualification standards
that require, among other things, an extensive knowledge of Navajo culture and
language, creates a system that for all its western elements is uniquely Navajo. And
it works.
B. Development of the Appointment Method as a Fundamental
Element of the Navajo Judicial System
A critical component of the modern Navajo judicial system is the method
of judicial selection.56 Navajo judges are selected through a unique appointive
system that incorporates participation from all branches of the Navajo government
and the public. First, candidate applications are reviewed by the Judiciary
Committee, a committee housed within the Navajo Nation Council.57 Selected
candidates are then forwarded to the President of the Navajo Nation who is charged
with choosing the final appointee. 58 The appointee is then subject to confirmation
by the Navajo Nation Council.59 Upon appointment, judges undergo a two-year
probationary period, after which the Chief Justice and Judiciary Committee again
independently review each judge‘s record and qualifications in order to make a
recommendation to the President on whether the judge should receive permanent
appointment.60 Moreover, the Judiciary Committee holds a public hearing where
anyone can comment or submit a written statement on whether a judge should
receive permanent appointment.61 The same process is utilized for District Court
Judges, Associate Justices, and the Chief Justice.
The current Navajo judicial selection method is the product of years of study,
experience and debate. When the Navajo Nation first assumed complete control of
its judiciary in October 1958, it addressed point blank whether an appointment
system is superior to judicial elections. The Nation answered in the affirmative,
citing individual judges‘ experiences with political pressure and the resultant
degradation of the judicial branch as a whole under the elective system that existed
from September 1950 to October 1958 with the Navajo Court of Indian Offenses. 62
Meeting minutes reveal the nature of such pressure, explaining that when a judge is
an elected official:
[S]ome precinct captain or election worker might be brought
before the judge for some crime, and he puts it this way: ―I have
made it my work to see that you got elected; I helped to get you
elected, and I was this and that, and elected you, and you must
look upon me with favor. Cut that sentence in half, or draw it out
and dismiss it, because of the favor I extended to you.‖63
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See 7 N.N.C. § 355.
Id. § 355(A).
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. § 355(B)–(E).
61
See Judiciary Committee of the Navajo Nation Council Resolution No. JCMY-02-09 Exhibit A ¶ 7
(May 21, 2009) (hearing rules for public testimony regarding the performance of probationary judges).
62
See, e.g., Meeting Minutes, Navajo Nation Council Meeting Minutes to Res. No. CO-69-58 (Oct. 14,
1958).
63
Id. at 244.
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Twenty years later, the Council returned to the issue, soliciting the
assistance of Dr. Edgar Cahn and Jean Camper Cahn, Co-Deans of Antioch School
of Law, in conducting an evaluation of the judiciary. The Cahns‘ study reaffirmed
many points highlighted in the 1958 reform, primarily the interference with
independent, reasoned judicial decision making under the prior system of electing
Navajo judges.64 Furthermore, the Cahn's found that ―[l]ifetime appointments
increase the independence of the judiciary and make it more likely that future
appointees will seek to declare themselves an independent branch of government.
Elected judges are less likely to take that risk.‖ 65
The appointive system was again considered in the 1980s by a special task
force, as well as by a joint study conducted by the Judiciary Committee and the
Board of Election Supervisors. The 1981 Task Force was created to find the
optimal way to structure the Navajo Nation court system to best serve the Navajo
people.66 The Task Force ultimately advocated for retaining the appointment
system, and improving it to ensure that only qualified judges are appointed and
politics are eradicated from the selection process. 67 The Joint Study arrived at the
same conclusion, finding Navajo Nation courts best improved by laws that remove
judges from politics, increase judicial qualification requirements, and provide for
on-going training and evaluation.68 The Joint Study specifically advised against
switching to judge selection by popular election.69
The most recent evaluation of the Navajo judiciary, including judicial selection
methods, occurred in 1990 with the Independent Judicial Review Task Force. This
entity came into existence via a council resolution to evaluate and make
recommendations on the competence and independence of the judicial system. 70 Its
membership consisted of a prestigious and diverse group of legal experts, such as a
federal district court judge, a state court judge, and the associate dean of the
National Judicial College, who solicited input from an exhaustive range of sources,
including the general public.71
The Task Force considered the issue of judicial selection at length and,
similar to its predecessor, unequivocally supported the appointment system. This
recommendation was founded in evidence demonstrating the current system‘s
effectiveness in serving the Navajo people and facilitating judicial independence. 72
Conversely, the Task Force determined that elective systems produce judges who

64

See generally Excerpt from EDGAR & JEAN CAMPER CAHN, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
COMMITTEE OF THE NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL (undated) [hereinafter CAHN REPORT]. The Cahn Report
was made part of the official record of Council proceedings. See Meeting Minutes, Navajo Nation
Council Res. No. CMY-39-78, 478–500 (May 4, 1978).
65
Id. at 9.
66
See Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CO-52-88 (Oct. 28, 1988); see also Should Navajo Nation
Judges Be Elected?, supra note 43, at 7.
67
Id. at 2.
68
Memorandum from the Navajo Judiciary Committee on Election of Judges to the Joint Committee
(Board of Election Supervisor and Judiciary Committee) 3 (Mar. 1, 1993) (on file with the author).
69
See Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CS-28-83, 3 (Sept. 28, 1983).
70
Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CO-52-88, supra note 66.
71
Should Navajo Nation Judges Be Elected?, supra note 43, at 8, 11–12.
72
Report and Recommendations Concerning the Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation, Independent
Judicial Review Task Force 31 (March 1990) (on file with the author).
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are less qualified and more subject to political influence, factors which damage the
public‘s perception of its judiciary.73 As one task force member testified:
[T]o give judges short term subjective reelection is to make them
subject to attempts to control their decisions and that‘s not a
proper exercise of the political function. Those whose cases are
going to be decided in your courts have to have confidence that
the law and not the public popularity will decide the case, the
outcome of that case, because … part of what courts do…is
protect rights of the minority. So they are not supposed to be
responsive to the public will and the popular will. 74
The Council accepted and approved the Task Force‘s recommendations through
Navajo Nation Council Resolution No. CJY-45-90 (July 18, 1990).
As this survey of legislative history demonstrates, the Navajo people have
repeatedly considered the merit of their appointive system, utilizing both external
and internal evaluation tools to consistently conclude that a move to judicial
elections would weaken the integrity of the Navajo courts.
IV.

Impacts of the Judicial Elections Referendum Act on the Navajo
Nation

Regardless of this long history, the Council once again opened the door to
judicial elections in 2010 by enacting the Judicial Elections Referendum Act.
However, numerous issues accompanied the referendum since its inception, such as
the legality of the referendum itself and the lack of public education concerning its
effects if voted into law. In September of 2010, the Navajo Nation Attorney
General challenged the validity of the referendum, finding that it violated sections
165(B) and 1005(C)(10) and (11) of Title 2 of the Navajo Nation Code. 75
Specifically, the Attorney General found that because the referendum proposed
new law and changes to existing law, it should have been submitted to the Navajo
Nation‘s President for his signature or veto.76 In response to the Attorney General‘s
opinion, the former Chief Legislative Counsel to the Navajo Nation Council stated
that the referendum did not itself add or amend Navajo law; rather, it referred the
issue to the Navajo people.77 Therefore, according to the Chief Legislative Counsel,
73

Id. at 31–32.
Meeting Minutes, Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CJY 45-90, 157 (July 18, 1990) (testimony of
Laurance M. Hyde, Associate Dean of the National Judicial College) (on file with the author).
75
See Press Release, Navajo Nation Office of the President & Vice-President, Attorney General Louis
Denetsosie Finds Legislation Invalid; Council Failed to Send to President to Sign, Veto (Sept. 8, 2010),
available at http://www.navajonsn.gov/News%20Releases/OPVP/Sep10/100910_Attorney%20General%20finds%20election%20of%2
0judges%20legislation%20invalid,%20for%20Sept.%208,%202010.pdf.
76
See id.
77
See Press Release, 21st Navajo Nation Council, Chief Legislative Counsel Says Referendum to Elect
Judges is Valid, Council Is Not Enacting Any Proposed Changes (Sept. 10, 2010), available at
http://www.navajonsn.gov/News%20Releases/NNCouncil/Sep10/100913_Chief%20_Legislative_Counsel_says_referendu
m_to_elect_judges_is_valid.pdf [hereinafter Referendum to Elect Judges]. It is worth noting that this
opinion comes from former Chief Legislative Counsel Frank Seanez, who has since been disbarred by
74
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the referendum took effect upon certification by the Speaker of the Navajo Nation
Council and did not need to be submitted for presidential review. 78 The matter was
eventually brought before the Window Rock District Court, which invalidated the
referendum after finding that it failed to involve the President‘s veto review as
required by Navajo statutory and common law.79 As a result of this decision, the
referendum language remained on the November 2010 ballot but votes were not
counted.80
Another contentious issue was whether the Navajo people had been
properly educated on the referendum‘s provisions and legal effects thereof.
Although public education measures were intended to accompany the referendum
prior to voting day, the Navajo Nation Council did not appropriate money for this
purpose. The Navajo Board of Election Supervisors (NBOES) initially tabled a
resolution approving the ballot language until sufficient funds for public education
could be obtained, reflecting concerns that ―the referendum the people are being
asked to vote on is not simply a ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ vote on whether the judges and
justices should be elected. … the [ballot] language leaves out information on
further amendments that would be enacted with the passage of the referendum.‖ 81
Nonetheless, NBOES later approved the ballot language—in spite of nonexistent
public education funding—and both the Navajo Nation Council and NBOES
contended that proper public education efforts had been made, citing public
hearings on judicial elections from 2002.82 Others contested whether those hearings
did in fact address the general issue of judicial elections and further criticized the
dearth of substantial public discussion and written education materials on this
specific referendum.83 In its recent opinion invalidating the referendum, the
Window Rock District Court echoed these concerns over the lack of proper
education efforts.84
Despite these procedural shortcomings, proponents of the referendum
claim that it was a necessary step to protect the Navajo people‘s democratic rights.
Specifically, the Navajo Nation Council found:

the Navajo Nation Supreme Court for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law while on suspension.
See also In re Frank Seanez, Corrected Opinion, No. SC-CV-58-10 (Nav. Sup. Ct. Jan. 25, 2011).
78
See generally Referendum to Elect Judges, supra note 77.
79
See Office of the Navajo Nation President, et al., v. Navajo Nation Council, et al., No. WR-CV-3042010 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. Oct. 29, 2010) [hereinafter NN President v. NN Council].
80
Id.; see also Press Release, 21st Navajo Nation Council, Judicial Elections Referendum Act of 2010
Invalidated by Judge Allen Sloan of the Tuba City District Court (Oct. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.navajonsn.gov/News%20Releases/OPVP/Nov10/101102_Judge%20Allen%20Sloan%20invalidates%20Judici
al%20Referendum%20Act,%20for%20Oct.%2031.pdf [hereinafter Invalidated by Judge Sloan].
81
Press Release, Judicial Branch, Navajo Board of Election Supervisors Table Ballot Language (Aug.
16, 2010).
82
See Press Release, Office of the President & Vice-President, OPVP Corrects Misinformation
Presented During KTNN Forum by Navajo Board of Election Supervisors’ Chairman, Vice Chairman 1
(Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www.navajonsn.gov/News%20Releases/OPVP/Oct10/102710_OPVP%20corrects%20NBOES%20misinformation%
20from%20forum,%20for%20Oct.%2026.pdf.
83
See id. Regardless of whether they discussed the judicial elections as a general matter, these hearings
occurred in 2002—prior to the passage of the Judicial Elections Referendum Act—and therefore could
not have addressed the scope and intricacies of that specific piece of legislation.
84
See NN President v. NN Council, supra note 79; see also Invalidated by Judge Sloan, supra note 80.
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[T]o ensure the fundamental right and freedom of the Diné to
participate in their democracy with an option to choose their
leaders in the Navajo Nation courts, and to ensure the people‘s
trust and confidence in the Navajo Nation Judiciary, the Dine
should have an opportunity to decide through a referendum vote
in the 2010 General Election whether Navajo Nation District
Court Judges and Supreme Court justices should be elected
positions … .85
Similarly, it has been argued that this referendum would strengthen the
Navajo people‘s trust and confidence in the judiciary, ostensibly by providing the
public with the power to decide whether or not to make judges elected officials. 86
Another reason, implicit in the overt rhetoric and underlying political struggle, is
concern with judicial power and a correlating desire to hold judges accountable for
their decisions. Critics of the referendum assert that the Council was retaliating
against judges for deciding against the Council in cases involving the council
reduction referendum and proposed legislation to prevent use of customary law in
Navajo courts.87 Critics also point to the Council Judiciary Committee‘s refusal to
grant permanent appointment to two associate justices and the Council‘s proposed
legislation to fire the Chief Justice as further evidence of retaliation against the
courts.88
Political considerations aside, a thoughtful evaluation of the current
judicial selection method and the potential consequences of switching to an elective
system reveals that the concerns voiced by the referendum‘s proponents are largely
unfounded and fail to outweigh the substantial problems created by the Judicial
Elections Referendum Act.
A. Democracy and Judicial Accountability in the Present System
While the current system does not involve direct selection of judges by the
public, the Navajo people are nevertheless afforded meaningful opportunities to
participate in the appointment process; namely through written statements and oral
testimony on a judge‘s qualifications during public hearings to decide whether a
probationary judge should be recommended for permanent appointment. 89
Additionally, the appointment process heavily involves each branch of government.
85

Judicial Elections Referendum Act, supra note 1 at 1-2.
Referendum to Elect Judges, supra note 77.
87
See, e.g., Felicia Fonseca, Navajo Nation’s Most Recent High Court Unraveling, NATIVE AM. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2010.
88
See, e.g., id.; Marley Shebala, High Court in Council’s Crosshairs: Both Associate Justices Out,
Council Taking Aim at Chief Justice, NAVAJO TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010.
89
See Judiciary Committee of the Navajo Nation Council Resolution No. JCMY-02-09 Exhibit A ¶ 7
(May 21, 2009) (hearing rules for public testimony regarding the performance of probationary judges);
see also, e.g., Press Release, Navajo Nation Council, Judiciary Committee Encourages Public Comment
on Work Performance of Probationary Judge William J. Platero, Reschedules Hearing to Sept. 30 (Sept.
21, 2010), available at http://www.navajonsn.gov/News%20Releases/NNCouncil/Sep10/100921_JC_encourages_public_comment_on_work_perf
ormance_of_probationary_District_Court_Judge_William_Platero.pdf (soliciting public feedback on
probationary judge).
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No single government branch or official exercises unilateral discretion in judge
selection; rather, the process begins with the Judiciary Committee, a committee of
the Navajo Nation Council, then moves to the Executive, and finally ends with
confirmation or non-confirmation back in the Navajo Nation Council. 90
Furthermore, the Judicial Branch, acting through the Chief Justice, has the
opportunity to weigh in at the conclusion of a judge or justice‘s probationary
period.91 Accordingly, the Navajo appointment system manifestly incorporates
each branch of government and the Navajo people in a meaningful way.
Underlying this process is the fact that each selected judge must pass muster with a
range of public officials who have been elected by the Navajo people to serve as
their representatives, and represent their voice. This reality diminishes the
argument for increasing democracy via direct election of judges.
Additionally, there exist numerous institutional checks against judicial
overreaching or malfeasance. Upon initial appointment, judges and justices are
placed on a 2-year probationary period during which they may be removed at any
time.92 At the conclusion of the probationary period, judges and justices are either
permanently appointed or removed from office. 93 Permanent appointment requires
a satisfactory review and recommendation by the Chief Justice and Judiciary
Committee, then presidential appointment, and finally council confirmation. 94
Individual accountability continues even after permanent appointment
through a myriad of mechanisms. Permanent judges and justices are subject to
yearly evaluations by the Chief Justice and members of the Navajo Nation Bar
Association.95 Additionally, the Judiciary Committee and the Chief Justice,
respectively, may recommend the removal of judges and justices for malfeasance,
neglect of duty, or mental or physical incapacity to perform judicial duties.96 The
Judiciary Committee and Chief Justice may also recommend removal where there
is substantial evidence that a judge or justice willfully or negligently made
significant misrepresentations or omissions regarding his or her qualifications on
his or her application for a judicial position.97 Lastly, another important check
against the judiciary is the authority of the Navajo Nation Council to create or
modify legislation in response to court decisions finding prior laws illegal or
defective.
B. Potential Consequences of Switching to an Elective System
A number of practical difficulties would likely arise upon a switch to
judicial elections. First, there would be the danger of judicial disconnect and
inefficient case management. Specifically, if judges become subject to elections
every four years, it creates the risk that judges will be replaced in the midst of
complex, on-going cases. New judges would need to familiarize themselves with
90

See 7 N.N.C. § 355.
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massive caseloads that often include cases which span years, involve convoluted
issues of fact or law, or both. Such a daunting familiarization process would
undoubtedly create case management problems and delay in case resolution.
Additionally, judges are currently required to successfully complete a
training course through either the National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada, or the
National Indian Justice Center in Petaluma, California. This requirement creates a
stable, experienced and well-trained judiciary; therefore, elections and judicial
turnover would result in the loss of experienced and knowledgeable judges.
Furthermore, the time and expense involved in training new judges every four
years would not be insignificant and would only challenge an already overburdened
and underfunded judiciary. 98
Another problem with switching to judicial elections would be ensuring
that the Navajo people are provided with the knowledge and tools to effectively
evaluate the qualifications of judicial candidates and performance of incumbents.
Presently, there are limited media communications in Navajo country and, with the
exception of the Navajo Nation-owned radio station KTNN, most do not convey
information in the Navajo language, which is still the primary language for a
majority of the Navajo population. Furthermore, the average Navajo voter arguably
lacks proper understanding of which qualities make for a competent judge and
therefore would either select a candidate on the basis of irrelevant factors, in effect
creating a popularity contest, or would not participate in voting at all.99 This
concern over insufficient voter education is only buttressed by the discord
surrounding public education for the Referendum itself.
Perhaps the most worrisome effect of judicial elections would be the
increased politicization of the judiciary. Under Navajo law, the judicial branch is an
integral part of the three-branch governmental structure, alongside the legislative
branch (the Navajo Nation Council) and the executive branch (the Navajo President
and Vice-President).100 Inherent to this system is the separation of powers doctrine,
which authorizes each branch to exercise its duties without interference from the
other two branches.101 This doctrine requires the existence of an independent
judiciary that is able to make decisions based on unbiased applications of the law,
which in turn provides an important check on other governmental branches.
Switching to an elective method of judicial selection raises serious threats
to the maintenance of an independent judiciary. As part and parcel of an elective
system, judges must maintain sufficient public approval in order to keep their jobs.
Therefore, it is unavoidable that elected judges are cognizant of public sentiment
98

Training courses are not inexpensive: a single three-day course with the National Indian Justice
Center costs $485, while a four-day course at the National Judicial College costs more than $1,200.
These estimated costs do not include lodging, transportation, or other miscellaneous expenses. See, e.g.,
Nat‘l Indian Justice Ctr., 2011 Training Schedule, http://www.nijc.org/training.html (last visited May 9,
2012); Nat‘l Judicial College, Courses: Court Management for Tribal Judges and Personnel,
http://www.judges.org/courses/2012/tcm0412.html (last visited May 9, 2012).
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See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 19, at 43 (doubting the electorate‘s ability to meaningfully evaluate the
qualifications of judicial candidates and performance of incumbents); ABA REPORT, supra note 23, at
27–28 (discussing how the public is often insufficiently familiar with judicial candidates, judicial
qualification and the justice system, which frequently leads to low voter turnout for judicial races).
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See Morgan v. Shirley, No. SC-CV-02-10, slip op. at 19–20 (Navajo Sup. Ct. June 2, 2010)
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present three-branch form of government in the Navajo Nation).
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when making decisions and consequently feel influenced to decide in a way that
garners public favor, as opposed to the way demanded by an objective application
of the law. This influence can arise from the parties themselves, special interest
groups, and the general public, particularly with cases concerning controversial,
highly publicized issues. Such an influence is not academic conjecture, but rather
the well-documented experience of judges from within and without Navajo
country.102 Furthermore, this problem is only exacerbated when considering the
importance of campaign financing in securing judicial elections and the influence
campaign contributors can have on recipient judges‘ decision making. 103
A weakened judicial branch can also have devastating impacts on the
Navajo Nation economy. On-reservation economic growth and stability are
inextricably tied to the functioning and independence of the tribal court system. 104
Harvard professor Joseph Kalt, an expert in the field of native nation building,
explains that:
[T[here is strong evidence that, in both Indian Country and
around the world, a judiciary and dispute resolution system that
is independent of legislatures and executives is critical for
economic development, social recovery, and maintenance of
political sovereignty. Investors—from the outside corporate
investor to the new college graduate trying to decide whether to
move ―back home‖ and invest in a career building his or her
nation—require security in the rules of the game. When the rule
of law erodes into the rule of raw politics, investment in the
community is discouraged, and encouraged to go to the multitude
of other locales where it feels more secure. 105

See, e.g., infra Part III.B (describing the Navajo judiciary‘s negative experience with judicial
elections). One prominent example of this problem is the recent ousting of three Iowa Supreme Court
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http://www.navajotimes.com/politics/election2010/080510primary.php (estimating 110,645 registered
voters in the Navajo Nation in 2010).
104
See generally Joseph Thomas Flies-Away, Carrie Garrow, & Miriam Jorgensen, Native Nation
Courts: Key Players in Nation Rebuilding [hereinafter Native Nation Courts], essay in REBUILDING
NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE & DEVELOPMENT (ed. Miriam Jorgensen 2007); see
also id. at 118 (highlighting the statistical correlation between court independence and tribal enterprise
profitability and noting that ―[a]n indispensable foundation [of successful business enterprises in Indian
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Navajo and non-Navajo investors and business owners want assurance
that their business activities will be governed in a uniform, predictable, and
unbiased fashion.106 Even the perception of improper influence over Navajo courts
or of the courts‘ incapacity to handle cases in a timely and efficient manner may
discourage business development on the Navajo Nation.
A prime example of this dynamic has already unfolded within the Navajo
Nation. In response to council initiatives to remove key Navajo officials from both
the executive and judicial branches, Key Bank—a non-tribal lending institution—
has threatened to restrict its previously strong business relationship with the Navajo
Nation. Specifically, Key Bank officials sent Navajo leaders a letter expressing
concern over reports of the potential termination of the Navajo Nation‘s Attorney
General, Deputy Attorney General, Chief Justice and two Associate Justices of the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court.107 The following excerpt from the Key Bank letter
emphasized this concern:
The independence and separation of the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of the Navajo Nation‘s
government were critical in Key [Bank]‘s extension of a Full
Faith and Credit loan to the Navajo Nation and Key [Bank]‘s
landmark agreement to have Navajo Law govern the transaction
and have disputes heard in the courts of the Nation. … The
exercise of influence by a separate branch of the Nation‘s
government on its judiciary will have an adverse impact on the
perception of the independence of the judicial branch, and its
ability to evaluate any unforeseen disputes solely on the merits of
the relevant facts and law and to enforce its rulings. 108
Under Key Bank and Navajo Nation‘s loan agreement, the removal of
these Navajo officials could be deemed ―material adverse events,‖ thereby allowing
Key Bank to freeze the release of additional loan money and demand an
accelerated repayment of money already loaned to the Navajo Nation.109 These
actions would seriously impair current development projects, such as the
construction of new judicial and correction facilities in Crownpoint and Tuba
City.110
Consequently, switching to judicial elections has the potential to do much
more than re-structure the manner in which Navajo judges are selected. The
implications are far-reaching and include increased administrative burdens, loss of
institutional knowledge, an inadequately educated electorate, increased
politicization and decreased independence of the judiciary, and destabilization of
the Navajo economy.
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CONCLUSION
The Navajo Nation has persevered, and thrived, in spite of a long history
of socio-political persecution and oppression. A critical element to the Nation‘s
present and future wellbeing is the maintenance of its judiciary—in particular, the
safeguarding of judicial independence through insulation of the courts from Navajo
politics. It is imperative that Navajo citizens and non-Navajo governments,
business entities, and individuals view the Navajo Nation court system as worthy of
respect and confidence, rather than as a mere puppet of other political branches or
leaders. Therefore, any movement to alter the structure of the judiciary must be
evaluated with a critical eye.
The changes proposed by the Judicial Elections Referendum Act had the
potential to adversely impact the efficacy and impartiality of the Navajo Nation
court system. Direct election of judges and periodic retention elections insert
judges into the political process and subject judges to improper influence by
constituents. Furthermore, increased turnover of Navajo judges creates a loss of
institutional knowledge, disrupts case management, and raises training costs. The
large-scale impacts include an overall weakening of the Navajo Nation judicial
branch and stunted on-reservation economic development. Although the Judicial
Elections Referendum Act is dead, the historical reoccurrence of the judicial
elections movement indicates that this issue will undoubtedly surface again in the
future. Therefore, Navajo Nation leaders and the Navajo public should carefully
consider the extensive ramifications before allowing internal politics and
misguided agendas to undermine the integrity of their esteemed judicial system.

